Mohammed al-Rumaihi
TT

The Immolation of Kasasbeh and the Assassination of Hariri

Both are undeniably criminal acts. The former, perpetrated by ISIS, was universally condemned. While there remains some doubt, Hezbollah was probably behind the latter. However, both are grounded in a troubled relationship with the past.

ISIS has been overwhelmingly condemned by mainstream Sunni (and, of course, Shiite) communities and institutions. The actions of Hezbollah, on the other hand, are legitimized in some circles, and its actions are driven by novel concepts, even within Shiism.

It must be emphasized that while the members of Hezbollah are Lebanese Shiites, not all Lebanese Shiites are Hezbollah. The party is an ideological group that believes in “Velayat-e Faqih” - a doctrine that had been contested for a long time. Ayatollah Khomeini transformed this controversy from a legal question into a matter of faith. Dozens of Shiite clerics opposed this doctrine. The Lebanese Shiite religious figures who rejected the idea include Sayyed Mohsen al-Amin, Sheikh Mohammad Jawad Mughniyeh, Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, Imam Moussa al-Sadr, and Sheikh Hani Fahs. In Iraq, Sayyed al-Khoei and Sayyed al-Sistani are its most prominent opponents. Even in Iran, the idea was met with opposition; notably from Khomeini’s own deputy, Sheikh Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, who spent the rest of his life under house arrest as a result of his apprehension that Khomeini would become a new Shah.

That is why the ongoing debate around Hezbollah’s weapons and the war with Israel is a small part of a much broader picture. Hezbollah does not see itself as part of Lebanon’s national fabric; its religious-political mission is furthering a broader cause.

From this perspective, some believe that any talk of Hezbollah handing over its weapons or agreeing to conditions is nothing more than a ruse to buy time and the party to achieve its long-standing goals. The party, in this reading, has absolutely no qualms about eliminating those it deems opponents hindering its project, hence the assassination of Rafik Hariri and numerous other Lebanese politicians.

Indeed, this claim can be defended using Hezbollah’s own literature. Two documents are particularly damning. The first is the “Open Letter” Hezbollah issued on February 16, 1985. “We, the Ummah (nation) of Hezbollah, consider ourselves part of the global Islamic Ummah, which God has blessed among the nations of mankind.” This discourse excludes everyone who does not share this identity. In fact, the document even calls on Lebanese Christians to convert to Islam: “We wish you well and call you to Islam so that you may find happiness in this world and the hereafter.”

The second document, the “Political Manifesto” Hezbollah released on November 30, 2009, does not address theological and ideological positions, which had been declared non-negotiable by the Secretary-General at the time. That is, it affirms the party’s fundamental mission, laid out in the former document, by omission: the establishment of an Islamic state (Velayat-e Faqih) and waging Jihad.

In the 2009 manifesto, Hezbollah presents its view of global, Arab, and Lebanese affairs, its vision for the Lebanese state and political system, and a defense of the need for “resistance” and its achievements. It asserts that the 2006 war with Israel ended in a “divine victory” and emphasizes the importance of the arms, equipment, and funding it receives from the Islamic Republic (Iran).

Fanaticism, whether Sunni or Shiite, is fundamentally and intrinsically detached from reality. Their delusions are what push some of these movements to engage in what the world calls “terrorism.”

According to Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, a pioneering modernist Islamic intellectual, Islam is a religion of knowledge and civilization. He called for freeing the intellect from the chains of imitation and affirmed that Islam does not confer infallibility to the Caliph, who is a civil ruler in every respect. As early as the 19th century, the Arab Renaissance movement stressed the urgent need for civic governance reforms. One key figure is Ali Abdel Raziq, whose 1925 book “Islam and the Foundations of Governance” advocated separating religion and state.

Belief in Velayat-e Faqih and identification with a constitutional nation-state are irreconcilable- any claim to the contrary is hollow. Yet, as Abdul-Hussein Allahyan explains in his book “Morning of the Levant,” decisions in Iran are made on all levels, but the infallible Imam has the final say.

Final word:

Mixing religion with politics is a toxic recipe for societies.